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Legislative Impact on Lending: Credit Risk Management in China 
 
Abstract 
 
The Chinese government established the Act on Commercial Banks 1995 to enforce and 
regulate commercial banking activities. The government envisaged that the Act, together with 
other bank reforms, would improve credit risk management practice among commercial banks, 
and hence the banks would reduce and ultimately stop local government directed policy lending 
to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper examines the lending behavior of a government-
controlled commercial bank before and after the passage of the Act. We find that the bank 
tightened control of the credit risk of borrowers after the passage of the Act. We also find that 
SOEs are charged a rate of interest higher than that charged to private firms.  
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1. Introduction 
A major objective of bank management is to increase its returns for owners. This, however, 
often comes at the cost of increased risk. It can be argued that the effective management of 
these risks is essential to bank performance. For most banks, loans are the largest and most 
obvious source of credit risk. Should a borrower default, the principal and the interest payments 
are at risk. In a frictionless capital market, risk is observable, thus effective credit risk 
management can be achieved through maximizing a bank’s risk-adjusted return by maintaining 
credit exposure within acceptable levels. However, in practice, the credit quality of many banks’ 
lending decisions is poor. One reason is the information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers. Numerous papers have been devoted to study how information asymmetry causes 
adverse selection and moral hazard behavior of borrowers, and how banks use screening and 
monitoring to effectively manage credit risk. This line of literature assumes banks have 
incentives to manage credit. In reality, this is not the case, especially for government banks. 
State-owned banks firmly believe that they would be bailed out by government should any 
bankruptcy possibility occur, thus have less incentive to manage credit risk. That is why we see 
the inefficiency of government banks worldwide (see La Porta et al., 2002; Barth et al., 2004; 
Berger et al., 2005). Besides the incentive issue, government banks are subject to intervention 
by politicians who often ask for lending to socially favorable projects or to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Therefore, it interests us to know what kind of credit risk management 
exists in a government bank and to ask whether government banks give favorable loan terms to 
SOEs. The answers to those questions are based more on anecdotal evidence and lack empirical 
support.  
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In this paper, we attempt to fill the gap by examining credit risk management in a state-
owned bank in China. In China, the financial system is dominated by the four of the largest 
state-owned banks. The bank credit/GDP ratio is 1.1 in China, while a sample average of 
English origin, French origin, German origin and Scandinavian origin countries’ bank 
credit/GDP ratio is 0.73 (Allen et al., 2005). This provides us with a good opportunity to 
examine credit risk management in the context of government banks.  
Before the early 1990s, there existed a weak legal system for banking regulation and 
supervision in China (Liu, 2000). Most banks were controlled by local governments through 
administrative means and were not regarded as commercial entities. Instead, they were treated 
metaphorically by local government as ‘automatic teller machines (ATMs)’ from which they 
withdrew money that they directed to state owned enterprises (SOEs). However, many SOEs 
were unprofitable or inefficient. As a result, local government directed (LGD hereafter) lending 
accounted for between 20 and 60 per cent of the assets of the four ‘state-specialized’ banks 
(Lou 1993). Consequently, a large number of non-performing loans (NPLs thereafter) 
accumulated.  
The large proportion of NPLs seriously affected the profitability of banks, such that the 
return on assets of banks decreased from 1.4 per cent in 1985 to 0.3 per cent by 1994 (Lardy 
1998).  
The central government addressed the problem of LGD in the early 1990s by enacting the 
Act on Commercial Banks 1995. Following this Act, state banks were no longer regarded as 
policy banks or state-specialized banks, but transformed to state-owned commercial banks. In 
other words, after 1995, state-owned commercial banks needed to set up criteria to screen 
borrowers because the Act required the banks to be responsible for their profits and losses. To 
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make this move credible, the central government implemented a series of reforms around 1995. 
The objective was to motivate banks to practice good credit risk management.  
Skeptics countered that, despite the intentions of the central government, the change in the 
banks might not necessarily be effective, citing two main issues. The first factor was the 
intervention of local governments in bank lending decisions. Many state banks were required to 
lend to SOEs to support the local economy. If such LGD lending persisted after the Act on 
Commercial Banks 1995, the Act would be deemed ineffective, impacting the bank’s 
profitability. The second factor is the moral hazard problem within state banks, which arises 
due to the nature of state ownership and lack of sufficient risk awareness to monitor loans.  
In this paper, we assess the impact of the Act on Commercial Banks 1995 on the lending 
behavior of state banks. Employing a unique database from a state-owned bank in China, we 
attempt to determine whether the quality of the lending practices of the bank improved after 
1995 when the Act on Commercial Banks 1995 was enacted. It is hypothesized that banks 
strengthened their credit risk control after 1995.  
This is a neglected aspect of Chinese bank lending behavior because there are limited studies 
on state banks in China due to the data collection difficulty. Cull and Xu (2000, 2003) studied 
banking reform before 1995, finding that bank employees’ assessment of SOEs’ credit risks 
was better than the assessment by bureaucrats and there was a positive relationship between 
bank financing and borrowers’ profitability. However, the relationships were weakened after 
1990 because banks imposed soft budget constraints on SOEs. Li et al (2001) show that low 
profitability of state-owned banks results from their higher ratio for non-interest expenses and 
lower interest margin than joint-equity banks. State-owned banks also generated lower returns 
with higher financial risks than their Western counterparts. Hwa and Lei (2010) reviewed 
reform strategy of Chinese state commercial banks and find strong financial performance after 
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the reform. Rowe et al. (2009) examine the relation between board governance and profitability 
of Chinese commercial banks. They find board governance characteristics, such as higher board 
ownership, lower percentage of insiders on board, and lower block ownership are associated 
with better bank profitability. Berger et al. (2009) study the efficiency of partially privatized 
state-owned banks. They find that minority foreign ownership is far more efficient than state 
ownership in terms of profit and cost efficiency in China. Chang et al. (2009) examine how 
useful banks’ internal credit rating scores are in predicting the default status of commercial 
loans in a major Chinese state-owned bank. They find that the internal credit ratings are 
significantly related to loan default and this credit rating measure is associated with commonly 
used financial ratios as well as specialty information detected by the bank. This paper is 
different from the literature in three ways. First, the above literature looks at how certain 
factors affected the outcome of bank performance. None of those papers look at the process of 
bank lending, that is, what kind of factors affect the loan contract design. Our paper explores 
the pricing behavior of a Chinese bank, that is, how borrower characteristics and loan 
characteristics interact with each other, which ultimately affects loan rate. To do this, unlike 
most papers on bank lending that view loan contract terms independently, we allow for 
interdependence between loan price and non-price terms in the determination of the loan 
contract. In this way, we can provide comprehensive evidence on credit risk management 
practice in China. Second, our sample period is relatively long, and this enables us to examine 
the impact of the Act on Commercial Bank 1995 on bank lending behavior. Thirdly, we take 
political factors into consideration and study whether state-owned banks give favorable terms 
to state borrowers. The findings would be useful to a wider group of policy makers, borrowers, 
lenders, and investors in evaluating the performance of government banks.  
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We use 2,459 commercial loans from a branch of a government-owned bank. In some tables, 
we split the sample into two periods, 1990-1995 and 1997- 2004
2
, and divide borrowers into 
two groups, SOEs and private firms. Using a simultaneous framework in which the lending 
rate, maturity, and collateral status are written into the loan contract, we compare the 
determinants of the interest rate spread in the two periods. Three main findings are presented. 
First, after 1995, the state bank undertook more rigid screening of its borrowers. Second, we 
find that the SOEs are charged an interest rate higher than that of private companies by six 
basis points. Third, we find that shortened loan maturity and use of collateral are used together 
in the state bank to reduce the information asymmetry. Overall, the results show the change in 
government bank-lending strategies that have had a positive effect on Chinese commercial 
banks.  
Section two briefly outlines banking reform in China. Section three presents a brief review 
of the relevant literature and theoretical predictions. Section four describes the sample and data. 
Section five discusses the methodology and presents the empirical results and section six 
presents our conclusions.   
 
2. A Short History of Chinese Banking Reforms 
The Chinese economic reform process officially began in December 1978 at the Third Plenum 
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Banking reform was a 
necessary part of the economic reform, and comprised three stages. The first ran from 1978 to 
1986. In the initial stage of the reform, the government implemented a new policy that required 
banks to take over financing functions from the government, which had granted funds to SOEs 
                                                 
2 The exclusion of observations for year 1996 in regression analysis (Table three) is to ensure the results are free from outliers 
which may occur due to the changes banks had for the adaptation to the newly enacted Act on Commercial Banks 1995. 
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without interest rate charges. That is, the central bank handed over the deposit and lending 
business to newly established state-owned specialized banks.  
The second stage took place between 1986 and 1994. In 1986, the Provisional Rules 
Governing Banks were issued. They listed the nature, responsibilities, and business boundaries 
of the People’s Bank (central bank), state-owned specialized banks, and other financial 
intermediaries. The Rules officially acknowledged that the banking system had changed from 
being a one-tier system (the People’s Bank only) to a two-tier system (the People’s Bank and 
specialized banks and other financial intermediaries). New financial institutions were permitted 
entry to the banking market and most of them were set up as joint stock banks the shareholders 
of which were the Ministry of Finance, central government controlled conglomerates, or local 
government. 
However, state-owned specialized banks did not actively manage credit risk; local 
governments seriously intervened in their lending activities. Many loans were granted on a 
political basis and charged a low interest rate. To help commercial banks to grant 
commercially-oriented loans, the third stage reform began in 1995 and continues today. In 
1995, the legal basis of the banking regulation system was established by implementing the Act 
of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks 1995 and the Act of the People’s 
Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China 1995, along with a number of additional 
administrative rules and regulations. The key aims of the legislation were to enhance the 
awareness of credit risk in the lending business among banks (paralleling a similar move by the 
Bank for International Settlements – Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999) to make 
commercial banks accountable for profitability and require banks to operate prudential banking 
operations.  
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3. Theoretical Prediction 
To solve the policy lending problem, three policy lending banks were established to take care 
of that aspect. As for the moral hazard problem (less incentive to manage credit risk of 
borrowers) within state banks, it was expected to be improved by the Act on Commercial Banks 
1995. However, there is still an element of information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders. Below we explain how different means can be taken in the state bank to reduce the risk 
arising from information asymmetry in the context of China.  
Collateral is an important feature to reduce risk arising from adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Both adverse selection and moral hazard models argue that the use of 
collateral can minimize the agency costs, but they provide different predictions of what type of 
borrowers are more likely to provide collateral. The adverse selection model (Bester, 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987) argues that banks have less information about risk when borrowers 
have private information about risk, thus banks would ask borrowers to post collateral to signal 
the quality. These models predict that better-quality borrowers would more likely provide 
collateral and pay a lower rate. On the other hand, the moral hazard model (Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997; Boot et al., 1991) states that, after obtaining a loan, borrowers have incentives for 
asset-substitution when firms take risky debt. These incentives are stronger for low-quality 
borrowers. Accordingly, banks can ask the borrowers to commit to lower asset substitution by 
providing collateral. The moral hazard model predicts that when risk is observable, low-quality 
borrowers are more likely to provide collateral and banks charge a higher rate. It is not clear 
whether it is the adverse selection or moral hazard problem that is more serious in China. 
Therefore, we will provide empirical evidence about which effect dominates.   
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Similar predictions can be applied to maturity because it is often used by the bank to reduce 
risk. This agency cost can be minimized by two mechanisms: (i) shortening maturity and 
asking for collateral together and (ii) either shortening maturity or asking for collateral. The 
first mechanism suggests that collateral and maturity are complementary. If this is true, we 
expect to have a negative relationship between the two. The second mechanism is that 
collateral and maturity are substitutes and are expected to have a positive relationship. In China, 
institutional and legal frameworks are not well developed and the credit history of borrowers is 
short. Therefore, we expect information asymmetry to be more serious than in developed 
countries. We predict the bank would use both collateral and maturity to minimize the risk. 
Thus we expect to see a negative relation between collateral and maturity.  
Relationship lending is also widely explored in the banking literature. The impact of the 
bank-borrower relationship is captured in relationship length. Conditional on its past experience 
with the borrower, the lender now expects loans to be less risky. This should reduce the lending 
rate of the loan over time. However, on the down side, a credible long-term relationship may 
leave the borrower and bank locked into one another, so the borrower may exploit the bank by 
paying a lower interest rate or the bank may exploit the borrower by charging a higher interest 
rate (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Therefore, relationship lending has both upside and downside 
risk. Which of these is dominant depends on the nature of both the borrower and the bank. 
Peterson and Rajan (1994) studied the impact of relationship lending on the availability and 
cost of funds to the borrower. They found that close ties between a firm and its creditor are 
valuable and that this close relationship increases the availability of financing to the borrower, 
but not the cost of financing. We are not certain whether the borrower-bank relationship will 
increase or reduce the interest rate and so we leave it to empirical testing.   
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Boot and Thakor (1994) consider the bank-borrower relationship using a model of multi-
period loan contracts in which the lending rate and collateral are determining factors. They 
argued that long-term contracting under a durable relationship enables the bank to effectively 
charge lending rates for borrowers through time by reducing the use of collateral. Therefore, 
banks require collateral from new borrowers and do not require collateral from established 
borrowers. Their study suggested a negative relationship between the length of a bank-
borrower relationship and collateral status. China is a country that widely uses collateral and 
we expect to find this negative relationship between a bank-borrower relationship and collateral.  
Diamond (1991) examined how borrowers choose a maturity structure and how their choice 
depends on their credit rating. Diamond (1991) assumed that a firm is subject to liquidation 
risk, which is defined as the risk that a firm is unable to pay back its debt and thus will be 
liquidated by lenders. He argued that good borrowers prefer a short-term debt contract because 
they can get better lending rates for refinancing when good news arrives. Bad borrowers prefer 
a long-term debt contract because the liquidation risk is lower compared with the liquidation 
risk under a short-term debt contract. However, borrowers with very poor rating can borrow 
only short-term debt because they are rationed out of the long-term debt market. Thus, we 
expect that borrowers in China have such preferences and expect to find a non-monotonic 
relation between a firm’s credit rating and its debt maturity.  
 
4. Data and Sample Selection 
The data we use are based on the records of 2,459 commercial loans (after excluding some 
unusual loans) drawn between 1990 to 2004 from a branch of a government-owned nationwide 
commercial bank (Bank A) with over 30 per cent state shareholding (the largest in the bank). 
These are the currently available best databases with complete data series. There are no missing 
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values or variables.  They have also been corrected (if there were any mistakes) by the internal 
examiners. Data are for internal use, and should be reliable. This government-controlled joint 
stock bank had over 2,000 branches and sub-branches and more than 50,000 employees across 
China by the end of 2004. It is truly a national and general-purpose bank, granting loans across 
industries to small-, medium-, and large-sized firms. The branch that we examined is located in 
the middle region of China. It has 25 sub-branches under its control. We believe this sample 
fairly reflects the general picture of the loan business in China given that the bank reforms and 
SOEs in the middle region are modest compared with those in the coastal region. There were 
654 borrowers, who, on average, had over three loan transactions with the bank. For each loan, 
we collected information on the contract terms and borrower characteristics. In some of the 
analysis, we split the sample into two periods, 1990-1995 and 1997-2004, to examine the 
impact of the Act on Commercial Banks 1995 on the lending behavior of a government-
controlled commercial bank, and divided the borrowers into two groups, SOEs and private 
firms. We exclude observations for 1996 in the regression analysis because the newly enacted 
Act on Commercial Banks 1995 caused substantial changes within banks. It took some time for 
this Act to be put into practice so the excluded year’s observations will ensure the results free 
from outliers.  
One important fact in the loan business in China is that the interest rate is censored 
(centrally controlled). The People’s Bank sets the basic interest (prime) rate and allows 
commercial banks to determine the lending rate within a stipulated band around the prime rate. 
The upper and lower limits vary from time to time and the band has a tendency to widen. The 
first time that this band was set within the sample period was 1990. However, censoring was 
not binding until 1995. On October 23, 1997, the People’s Bank set the bank rate at 10 per 
cent of the basic interest rate for short-term loans (one-year loans). The latest revision of the 
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band in the sample period was on June 10, 1999. It was set at -10 percent and +50 per cent of 
the basic interest rate for both short-term and long-term loans.  
Policy lending could be a factor affecting bank lending. However, it is very difficult to 
identify which loans are ‘crony’ loans. We observed that there are a few loans that were lent 
and then returned within one month. The average size of these loans is twice the average loan 
size. It seems that the bank has an unusual relationship with those borrowers, which may be 
policy lending. Therefore, we deleted those unusual loans (15 observations).  
The credit profile we used specified: (1) the characteristics of the borrower (firm size, 
relationship length with the bank, SOE or private, industry sector); (2) the characteristics of the 
credit (interest rate spread, amount of loan, maturity, collateral, and guarantees (acceptance 
bill)); and (3) the ex ante performance of the loan (credit rating). Full variable definitions are 
given in the appendix. 
Table one shows the basic data about the lending terms in the sample broken down into 
three sets of characteristics: ownership, collateral, and firm size. There are 2,459 loans granted 
with a mean of RMB6,970,078 (US$870,000) per loan, but loan size varies between 
RMB22,400 (US$2800) and RMB300,000,000 (US$37,500,000)
3
. This wide variation is due to 
the long sample period and the fast growth of Chinese enterprises. The average interest rate 
spread on loans in our sample is 0.688. The spread varies considerably from -4.98 to 5.76 per 
cent. Despite the large variation, the spread of 95 per cent of the loans falls within the band 
stipulated by the People’s Bank.   
The maturity of a loan is another important factor in the debt contract. We include it as a 
proxy for the risk that is associated with the time until the loan is repaid. Most loans from the 
branch are short term because the average maturity is 9.6 months. 
                                                 
3 The exchange rates of the renminbi against the U.S. dollar from 1990 to 2004 are available from the author. 
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The relationship characteristics control the information and experience effects. We include 
the natural logarithm of (one plus) the duration of the relationship in our analysis. A 
relationship starts from the first time that a firm obtained a loan from the bank. The average 
duration of the relationship is 1.33 years with the maximum of 7 years.  
We also include the bank’s own ex ante credit rating on the loan to control the risk. It has a 
mean of 3.295 on a rating scale where one is the best rating and six is the worst rating. The 
score is estimated on the basis of a number of factors such as the financial health, industry 
outlook, past loan performance and growth prospects of the firm. All these factors are 
associated with default risk and represent a firm’s aggregate risk factor.  
Panel B shows that SOEs borrow a larger volume and have a lower interest rate spread and 
longer maturity term than do private firms. The favorable terms are supported by their better 
credit rating and longer relationship with the bank. Panel C shows that collateral loans are 
granted at a larger volume and higher interest spread. These loans have a poorer credit rating 
than non-collateral loans. This result is consistent with the regulations that are set by the 
People’s Bank and the findings of Berger and Udell (1990) that collateral is most frequently 
associated with riskier borrowers and riskier loans. Panel D compares the loan characteristics 
for different borrowers. Small firms borrow at low volume, higher interest rates and for shorter 
periods. This is probably because their credit rating is poor and their relationship length with 
the bank is shorter. The situation is reversed for large borrowers. In general, as small firms are 
more likely to be a greater risk than are large borrowers, the loan terms are less favorable to 
small firms than to large firms. 
In summary, table one gives a general picture of the loan characteristics. We find that 
favorable loan terms are granted when borrowers have a good credit rating and a longer 
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relationship with the bank. Firm size and collateral status are also associated with the risk 
(credit rating).  
Table two describes the debt contract terms, borrower characteristics, and the bank’s 
industry portfolio for SOEs and private firms for the two sub-sample periods. 
Panel A, in table two shows that the volume of the loans expanded to six times larger than it 
was in the first sample period, which suggests the strong financial needs of borrowers. The 
interest rate spread declines from 2.5 to 2.6 per cent to 0.4 to 0.5 per cent over the sample 
period, which may largely result from the increased competition among domestic banks. This 
decline is more severe for SOEs than for private firms. The maturity of the loan is longer, 
especially for private firms. In general, the average maturity is less than one year, which 
suggests that most of the loans are short term and used as working capital. With regard to credit 
rating, we find that the average credit rating of SOEs (2.931) is better than that of private firms 
(3.311). Finally, the relationship length is longer for borrowers in the second sample period 
than in the first and it is longer for SOEs than for private firms. 
Panel B shows the collateral status and firm characteristics for the two periods and two types 
of enterprises. Since 1996, 72.3 per cent of private borrowers have provided collateral or 
guarantees to the bank, while 53.2 per cent of SOEs have done so. The borrower’s size is not 
equally distributed. Most SOEs are medium- and large-sized, while most private firms are 
small- and medium- sized. 
Panel C shows the industry distribution of granted loans. For the first sample period, we find 
that, for SOEs, the loans are mainly granted to the manufacturing, commercial, and foreign 
trade industries, and there is not one loan given to any private firm in foreign trade before 1995. 
This is largely due to the regulation of the foreign trade business. Moreover, it might have been 
too risky at that time for a private firm, located in the middle region of China, to do 
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international trade in the early years of the economic reform. During the period from 1997-
2004, we find that the industry distribution is more diversified for the two types of firms. The 
bank granted more loans in the commercial sector and fewer loans in the manufacturing sector 
for private borrowers. The loans in the private commercial sector account for 41.3 per cent of 
the loans that are granted to private firms compared with 28.6 per cent in the manufacturing 
sector. The bank also granted fewer loans in the manufacturing sector and more loans in the 
foreign trade sector to SOEs. 
 
5. Methodology and Results 
Our paper follows the studies of Diamond (1991), Boot and Thakor (1994), and Rajan (1992) 
and tests their predictions in the simultaneous equation framework that was proposed by 
Dennis et al. (2000). To reflect the joint consideration of the contract terms, they model the 
choice of maturity and collateral status and then model the lending rate and commitment fee, 
which are determined by the choice of maturity and collateral status. We follow their 
methodology, but consider only the first three contract terms and ignore the commitment fee 
because the bank in our sample does not have a commitment fee in its loan pricing. The model 
takes the following form: 
Maturity = 1111 eXCollateral 
  ,     Equation (1) 
Collateral = 2222 eXMaturity 
  ,     Equation (2) 
Interest rate spread = 33343
eXMaturityCollateral  
,  Equation (3) 
where Collateral is a discrete [1,0] variable, and the interest rate spread is the difference 
between the loan rate and prime rate; i

 are the coefficients of the interdependence effects 
between the contract terms; Xk (k = 1 to 3) are the vectors of the other explanatory variables 
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with K  representing the effect of the contract terms on those three debt features; and eK are 
the residuals.  
    Following Diamond (1991), we include firm size, credit rating, and the square of credit 
rating as explanatory variables in equation (1) to capture the non-monotonic relationship 
between credit rating and the maturity of a loan. In equation (2) we include firm size, credit 
rating, and relationship length as explanatory variables to test Boot and Thakor’s (1994) finding 
that there is a negative relationship between loan collateral and relationship length.  
 A difficulty in estimating these simultaneous equations is that the dependent variables 
include a mix of discrete choice (collateral), continuous (maturity), and censored (interest rate) 
variables. Our approach is to apply a two-stage estimation procedure for simultaneous equation 
models with limited dependent variables. In the first stage, we use the maximum likelihood 
method to estimate a reduced form model for each of the endogenous variables. Then, in the 
second stage, the structural parameters are estimated by substituting the reduced form fitted 
values for the endogenous variables using the least squares methods. 
 
5.1 Bank lending rates before and after 1995 
Table three presents the regression estimation of equations (1), (2), and (3). We split the sample 
into two periods, 1990-1995 and 1997- 2004 in table three. The exclusion of observations for 
year 1996 in regression analysis is to ensure the results are free from outliers that may occur 
due to the changes banks had for the adoption of the newly enacted Act on Commercial Banks 
1995. 
 
5.1.1 Loan pricing for SOEs and private firms 
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The regression results in columns three and six of Table three show the determinants of the 
interest rate spread during the two periods.  
The coefficient on State is not significant in 1990-1995 period, but is significant in the 1997-
2004 period. It suggests that ownership was not an important element in the debt contract 
before the Act. We also find that SOEs paid slightly higher interest rates than private borrowers 
by 6.8 basis points from 1997 to 2004. This result is different from the conventional view that 
SOEs receive ‘soft’ loans from state banks. To reconcile the problem, we need to note that the 
descriptive statistic in table two shows that SOEs are, on average, charged a lower interest rate. 
However, the descriptive statistic simply compares the interest rate differences whereas the 
simultaneous regression analysis is based on multiple factors after controlling for endogeneity, 
interest rate censoring, etc. To enhance the credibility of the results, we interviewed the bank 
officials. They were not surprised by the results and gave an explanation that the state firms 
cared less about the borrowing cost, while private firms cared more about the cost of debt, 
which enabled the Bank to charge higher lending rates and take advantage of the SOEs. To 
validate this argument, we split the sample into listed firms versus unlisted firms. Within the 
listed firm sample, state borrowers have access to the stock market; we expect that the bank 
does not have the bargaining power to charge high interest rates to state firms that are also 
listed firms. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the coefficient on State is not 
significant in the listed firms’ sample. We also conducted the same analysis for the unlisted 
firms sample and the results were similar to the main results in table three.
4
  
For a follow-up investigation, we report the interest rate charged to SOEs and private firms 
year by year in panel A of table four. The t statistic is reported after 1994 because there are not 
enough observations for the t statistic before 1994. The differences in interest rates are 
                                                 
4 The results are not reported here and are available from the author upon request. 
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significant for only three years, suggesting that most of time the SOEs do not necessarily obtain 
favorable prices. SOEs paid a lower interest rate in 1999 and 2004, but they also received lower 
loans by USD257,000 and USD536,585 on average per each loan. The only puzzling year is 
2000 where SOEs received a low lending rate and large loan amounts at a similar credit rating. 
The observations that year were 145, which is relatively small. Thus, the simple statistics do 
not support the conventional view after the initiation of Act on Commercial Banks 1995.      
Another way to study whether SOEs receive ‘soft’ loans is to examine the sample of 
eliminated customers. Every year, the bank eliminates certain customers, which, by definition, 
the bank would not give loans to in the future. Panel B of Table four reports the number of 
customers being eliminated per year. We find that the number peaked in year 1997, and then 
went down. In general, the difference between SOEs and private borrowers is not significant.  
    Thus the sample shows that there is no particular bias in terms of ownership in eliminating 
poor borrowers.   
The coefficient on State*credit_rating is significant at 0.046. This coefficient suggests that 
the interest rate spread increases by 4.6 basis points for state loans if the credit rating changes 
one point. The credit ratings for private firms are not significant possibly due to the credit 
rationing effect, i.e., bad private borrowers might have been rationed out of the credit market. 
Our results suggest that the bank has strengthened its credit risk control for SOEs. There are 
several possible factors that could drive the results. First, government intervention was reduced 
after 1998. In 1998, the People’s Bank replaced its 30 provincial branches with nine cross-
province regional branches with the aim to reduce the influence of local governments on bank 
lending activities. The bank officials were replaced by new staff who had little connection with 
the local government. Second, SOEs are more risky than private firms due to the massive 
reforms applied to SOEs in late 1990s. The biggest uncertainty associated with SOEs’ reform is 
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that local government may not bail out the SOEs if they were not performing well. These two 
factors are not applicable to private firms and that could be a reason that the bank would charge 
slightly higher interest rates for SOEs that have low credit ratings.  
 
5.1.2 Interdependence 
The coefficients of the contract feature the interdependence term, i , which are also of 
interest. There is strong evidence that the choice of contract features is interrelated with six of 
the eight interdependence terms being statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
These results provide support for the use of the simultaneous equation framework that choices 
of loan features are interrelated. Moreover, we find that there is a negative relationship between 
the collateral status of a loan and the maturity of a loan in both periods. This relationship was 
weaker from 1990-1995. This result supports our prediction that information asymmetry is 
more serious in China so shortening maturity and asking for collateral complement each other 
in Chinese banks to reduce information asymmetry. This result is also consistent with Denis et 
al. (2000) 
 
5.1.3 Contract design 
We find strong evidence for several predictions concerning loan contract design as discussed 
in section 3 as well as current literature.  
The length of maturity has an impact on loan pricing. In column three of table three, the 
coefficient of maturity is significantly negative at the one per cent level: an increase in maturity 
from, for example, one year to two years, reduces the loan rate by 142.4 basis points. When we 
tabulate the loan rate versus maturity, we see a clearly downward slopping yield curve, 
especially for loans with less than one year maturity. The negative effect of maturity on the 
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loan rate is consistent with the result in Degryse and Ongena (2005). They find that the 
negative relation holds for loans with a maturity shorter than five years, but when loans have a 
maturity longer than seven years, the increased duration increases the lending rate. Thus, the 
yield curve can be humped with the maturity.
5
 Ninety per cent of the 168 bank loans from 
1990-1995 had maturities of less than one year. This explains the negative coefficient of 
maturity in the regression.  
Collateral is an important factor in loan pricing. The coefficient on fitted collateral is 
significant at 0.906 and 0.115 in columns three and six, respectively, of table three. The result 
supports the moral hazard model that riskier borrowers are more likely to be required to 
provide collateral and be charged a higher interest rate because banks can use collateral to 
reduce the borrowers’ incentives for asset-substitution.  
The relationship lending story is found in column three. Borrowers with a longer 
relationship were charged lower interest rates than are borrowers with a shorter relationship by 
125.6 basis points. This shows that a longer bank-borrower relationship leads to better lending 
rates for borrowers. However, we did not find evidence of this in the second sample period (in 
column six), probably due to the strong interest rate censoring that started in 1997, which left 
the bank limited room to favor long-term customers in terms of the lending rate. 
Evidence for the predictions on the relationship of maturity and credit rating is also 
supported. However, the evidence occurs in the period from 1997-2004, which suggests that the 
loan pricing mechanism has become more rational after the Act. There is a non-monotonic 
relation between maturity and credit rating in column four, that is, borrowers with good credit 
ratings have short-term debt because they can get better terms for refinancing. Those with 
intermediate ratings have long-term debt and those with poor ratings can have only short-term 
                                                 
5 The results are not reported here and are available from the author upon request. 
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debt because they are rationed out of the long-term debt market, which is consistent with the 
result of Diamond (1991).  
We also find a negative relationship between the length of a bank-borrower relationship and 
the secured status in column five, which is consistent with the findings of Boot and Thakor 
(1994). A long-term banking relationship helps to reduce the information asymmetry and the 
bank requires less collateral to price the loan.  
Firm size has a significant impact on loan pricing. Large firms pay 36.9 basis points less 
than small firms and medium firms pay 18.9 basis points less than small firms. These findings 
are consistent with the literature, that is, large firms pay lower interest rates than do medium or 
small firms. This size effect is not found in column three for the first sample period, which 
suggests the increasing awareness of risks among bank officials and their recognition of firm 
size as a risk factor. 
In general, the results from table three suggest that the bank tightened control of the credit 
risk of borrowers after the passage of the Commercial Banks Act 1995. 
 
5.2 Subsample analysis of credit rating 
We now examine whether the credit rating that a bank assigns correctly reflects the financial 
status of a firm. Panel A of table five provides the summary statistics of the credit ratings for 
each year since 1997. It shows a clear trend that, over time, the average rating decreases 
(implying that the average quality of borrower improved) from 4.8 in 1997 to 2.2 in 2004.  
To explore whether the credit rating reflects the financial health of borrowers, we use 
Altman’s Z score as a proxy for the financial status of the borrower (Altman, 2002). It is a 
balance-sheet method of determining a company’s financial health. We used a sub-sample of 
listed companies where we were able to obtain financial statements for the listed firms. There 
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are 17 borrowers with 132 observations from 1997-2004. The Z score is calculated following 
Altman (2002):  
Z = 1.2WC_TA + 1.4RE_TA + 3.3EBIT_TA + 0.6MV_BV + 0.99S_TA 
where WC_TA: working capital/total assets, RE_TA: retained earnings/total assets, EBIT_TA: 
earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, MV_BV: market value of the equity/book value 
of total liabilities, S_TA: sales/total assets, and Z: overall index. 
The higher Altman’s Z score indicates greater financial health of the borrower. The 
descriptive statistics and Spearman correlation coefficients for the key variables are reported in 
panels B and C of table five. In panel B, the credit rating has a mean of 1.65 within a range of 
one to two. Due to the low variation of Credit rating, we use the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient to examine the relationship between credit rating and the Altman’s Z score, and 
with each element of the Altman’s Z score. The correlation results are presented in panel C. We 
find that the higher the level of working capital, retained earnings, and EBIT are, the better the 
credit rating of the borrower. Leverage and sales did not have a significant effect on credit 
rating, which could result from the short-term characteristics of loans. On average, each loan 
was granted for 10 months. It is not surprising that the bank is more concerned with liquidity 
and profitability measures than with leverage and sales, which are more useful in long-term 
loan risk evaluation. 
To supplement our analysis, we use censored-normal regression that fits a model of the 
interest rate spread on Altman’s Z score and other independent variables. The censored-normal 
regression considers a case in which the dependent variable interest rate spreads are censored 
differently each year. The results
6
 show that Altman’s Z score has a significant negative impact 
on the interest rate. For a one unit increase in the Altman’s Z score, the bank decreases the rate 
                                                 
6 The results are available from the author upon request.  
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by 11.4 basis points for that borrower. Credit_rating still shows a significant impact on the 
interest rate, which suggests that credit rating captures factors other than financial information. 
Taken together, the findings show that financial ratios, particularly liquidity and profitability 
measures, are related to credit rating, and that the overall financial status of borrowers is 
correctly priced by the bank.  
 
5.3 Non-performing loan performance after the Act on commercial banks 
In the above analysis, we found that the bank tightened its risk control of borrowers after the 
enactment of the Act on Commercial Banks 1995. If the bank has correctly measured the risks, 
then we can expect a decrease in the number of non-performing loans, which is a key measure 
of the quality of a bank’s assets. Table six reports the ratio of annual nonperforming loans 
(NPL ratio) to total credit from 1994-2005. The NPL ratio of the bank reduced from 65 per cent 
in 1995 to 3.8 per cent in 2005, which means that 65 per cent of the loans turned out to be bad 
loans in 1995 whereas only 3.8 per cent of the loans turned out to be bad loans in 2005. The 
trend of a reduced NPL ratio was found in many commercial banks. By the end of 2006, the 
NPL ratio in the four big state commercial banks was 9.22 per cent and the NPL ratio in the 
remaining 12 commercial banks was 2.81 per cent.
7
 Our finding that the bank strengthened its 
credit risk control supports the decrease in the NPL ratios that were found in many commercial 
banks.   
     
5.4 Comparison with other banks and other economies.   
                                                 
7 The four big state commercial banks are the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China. The remaining 12 commercial banks are the Bank of Communications 
Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd., Guangdong Development Bank, China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd., Hua Xia 
Bank Co., Ltd., China Minsheng Banking Corporation Ltd., China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd., Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank Co., Ltd., China International Trust and Investment Industrial Bank (CITIC), Industrial Bank Co., Ltd., Evergrowing 
Bank Co., Ltd., and China Zheshang Bank. 
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After bank loans are classified as non-performing loans, banks usually would sell NPLs to one 
of the four asset management corporations (AMC) that focus on the recovery of NPLs. Based 
on various publications from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, we report the 
recovery rates from the earliest available date in Table seven. On average, the recovery rate 
was stable at 24 per cent for asset recovery and 20 per cent for cash recovery from 2004 to 
2006. The bank has lowest NPL ratio among all the state-owned commercial banks. This 
should highly correlate with its tight controls on credit risk. 
In terms of the overall efficiency of the state bank, Allen et al (2005) compared China with 
other economies on finance efficiency. China’s measure was below all in the sub-sample of 
LLSV countries (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998). This suggests that China’s financial system is 
under-developed relative to most other countries. 
 
5.5 Robustness of the results 
A criticism that we anticipate concerns the representativeness of the bank’s data. An empirical 
study based on one bank’s data may not speak for the changing lending behavior of banks in 
China. To address this issue, we employed a database from another government-owned joint 
commercial bank (Bank B) with more than 30 per cent state ownership. Bank B is located in 
the same area as Bank A. It has nine sub-branches under its jurisdiction. The database we used 
covers 1999 to 2004. We conducted a similar regression analysis for Bank B. In general, the 
results showed that Bank B carefully screens each borrower. We found that firm size, relation 
length, and past loan status were important factors in pricing.
8
 
 
                                                 
8 Results are available from the author upon request. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper empirically analyses the lending behavior of a Chinese government bank before and 
after the enactment of the Act on Commercial Banks 1995. We have three important findings. 
First, we find that the bank tightened credit terms in granting loans after the passage of the Act 
in 1995. To be more specific, the credit rating of the firm, the size of the borrowing firm, the 
collateral status of a loan, and the ownership of borrowers are all important determining factors 
in the interest rate. Second, we find that the bank charges SOEs an interest rate higher than that 
charged to private firms by 6.8 basis points. Third, we find negative interrelationships between 
loan maturity and the collateral status of a loan which suggests that shortening maturity and 
asking for collateral are complementary in reducing the information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders.  
The findings of this paper are based on the results obtained from an analysis of data from a 
provincial branch of a government-controlled commercial bank. Although the data are limited 
to one commercial bank, our findings should apply to other government controlled commercial 
banks in China, and therefore, can be generalized. If the Act on Commercial Banks 1995 is 
effective, we can expect that the ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total credit will 
decrease for all commercial banks. The evidence shows that the NPL ratio of this bank was 
reduced, from 65 per cent in 1995 to 3.8 per cent in 2005. This reduction is consistent with that 
of other nationwide banks, that is, the NPL ratio in four big state commercial banks was 
reduced to 9.22 per cent, and the NPL ratio in the remaining 12 commercial banks was reduced 
to 2.81 per cent.
9
 
One weakness of this paper is the unavailability of credit ratings and financial data before 
1995. Due to the slow development of risk management in the banking industry in China, 
                                                 
9 The data source is from Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2007.  
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banks did not perform systematic credit assessment of borrowers in the early 1990s. The 
unavailability of these data, from another perspective, supports our hypothesis that the state 
banks started to control credit risk only after the enactment of the Act in 1995.  
This is the first empirical research that reports comprehensive evidence of the recent 
progress in bank lending behavior by evaluating the impact of the Act on Commercial Banks. 
This investigation is timely, because there is ongoing banking reform in China. It is important 
because it also provides some insights into a government banking system in transition. The 
findings of this paper also contribute toward the understanding of the importance of 
institutional development (i.e., an improved economic and legal environment) in financial 
markets. Finally, the recent credit risk management failures in the US sub-prime market 
suggest strongly that a focus on bank lending is not solely in the purview of developing nations, 
but remains a vital issue worldwide.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
R_diff interest rate spread (in percentage form) between the interest rate that is 
charged on the loan and the prime rates of comparable maturity 
Loan size natural logarithm of the amount of each loan 
Amount of loan the amount of each loan in RMB 
Maturity_year length of repayment of the loan in years 
Relation_ length natural logarithm of (one plus) length of relationship with the current 
borrower 
Collateral_loan 1 if the loan is secured via collateral or guaranteed, 0 otherwise 
Small firm 1 if the borrower is a small firm, 0 otherwise 
Medium firm 1 if the borrower is a medium firm, 0 otherwise 
Large firm 1 if the borrower is a large firm, 0 otherwise 
State 1 if the borrower is a SOE, 0 otherwise 
Private 1 if the borrower is not a SOE, 0 otherwise 
Credit_rating risk profile score for each firm that is made by a bank officer. It ranges from 
1 (best) to 6 (worst) 
Industry dummies six industry affiliations—manufacturing, commerce, construction, 
foreign_trade, real_estate, and nonclassifiable establishments 
Acceptance bill if the borrower purchased the banker’s acceptance bill10 from the bank, 0 
otherwise 
WC_TA working capital/total assets 
RE_TA retained earnings/total assets 
EBIT_TA earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
MV_BV market value of the equity/book value of total liabilities 
S_TA sales/total assets 
Z Altman Z score 
BVE_TL book value of equity/total liability 
                                                 
10 When a bank issues a banker’s acceptance bill to the purchaser of the bill, the bank has an obligation to make payment to the 
bearer of the bill at the maturity day. After the payment by the bank to the borrower, the purchaser repays the funds to the bank 
within 6 months. Hence, the issuance of a banker’s acceptance bill is equivalent to the granting of a short-term loan to the 
purchaser. The procedure for checking and evaluating the risks for issuing a banker’s acceptance bill to a purchaser is the same 
as for granting a loan. 
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Table 1: Descriptive data 
This data set comprises 2459 bank loans from 1990 to 2004. Panel A presents the basic data on 
lending terms in the whole sample. Panel B present the subsample data classified according to 
ownership. Panel C present the subsample data classified according to collateral status. Panel D presents 
the subsample data classified according to firm size.     
Note: * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level.  
Panel A Whole Sample 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Amount of 
loan(RMB) 2459 6,970,078 13,500,000 22,400 300,000,000 
Loan size 2459 14.720 1.500 10.017 19.519 
R_diff(%) 2459 0.688 1.118 -4.980 5.760 
Maturity 2459 0.795 0.506 0.077 7.003 
Credit_rating 2262 3.295 1.518 1.000 6.000 
Relation_length 2459 0.653 0.602 0.000 2.140 
      
Panel B SOEs Private firms  
Variables N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 1660 7,093,843 799 6,712,945 388,898 
Loan size 1660 14.799 799 14.557 0.242** 
R_diff 1660 0.615 799 0.840 -0.225** 
Maturity 1660 0.812 799 0.761 0.051** 
Credit _rating 1536 3.136 726 3.632 -0.496** 
Relation_length 1660 0.715 799 0.526 0.188** 
    
Panel C Collateral_loan Noncollateral_loan  
Variables N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 1461 8,214,867 998 5,147,797 3,067,071** 
Loan size 1461 14.877 998 14.491 0.386** 
R_diff 1461 0.786 998 0.545 0.241** 
Maturity 1461 0.805 998 0.781 0.024 
Credit _rating 1338 3.373 924 3.183 0.190* 
Relation_length 1461 0.655 998 0.652 0.003 
      
Panel D Small firm Medium firm Large firm 
Variables N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Amount of loan 754 3,305,662 1150 5,407,841 555 15,200,000 
Loan size 754 14.088 1150 14.621 555 15.783 
R_diff 754 1.139 1150 0.581 555 0.298 
Maturity 754 0.763 1150 0.797 555 0.838 
Credit_rating 703 3.954 1071 3.120 488 2.730 
Relation_length 754 0.504 1150 0.649 555 0.865 
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Table 2: Individual loan terms and industry distribution across the two sample periods 
 
 1990-1995  1997-2004  
Variables SOEs Private firms  SOEs Private firms  
Panel A N Mean N Mean Difference N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 99 1,650,960 69 1,117,246 533,713 1489 7,638,317 661 7,860,144 221,826 
Loan size 99 13.505 69 13.063 0.442* 1489 14.916 661 14.814 0.102 
R_diff 99 2.577 69 2.640 -0.063 1489 0.410 661 0.525 -0.115** 
Maturity 99 0.760 69 0.499 0.261** 1489 0.817 661 0.791 0.026 
Credit_rating 86 - 69 - - 1489 2.931 661 3.311 -0.38** 
Relation_length 99 0.114 69 0.173 -0.059 1489 0.779 661 0.600 0.179** 
           
Panel B N Percentage N Percentage  N Percentage N Percentage  
Collateral_loan  99 63.6 69 52.2 11.4 1489 53.2 661 72.3 -19.1** 
Small firm 99 46.5 69 76.8 -30.3** 1489 23.34 661 39.79 -16.45** 
Medium firm 99 49.5 69 23.2 26.3** 1489 49.2 661 46.0 3.2 
Large firm 99 4 69 0 -4* 1489 30.4 661 14.2 16.2** 
           
Panel C N Percentage N Percentage  N Percentage N Percentage  
Commerce 99 31.3 69 37.7 6.4 1489 28.6 661 41.3 -12.7** 
Construction 99 1 69 2 -1 1489 6.8 661 4.4 2.4** 
Foreign trade 99 15.1 69 0 15.1** 1489 26.5 661 2.4 24.1** 
Manufacturing 99 50.5 69 53.6 -3.1 1489 24.5 661 29.0 -4.5* 
Nonclassifiable 
Establishment 
99 2 69 1.44 0.56 1489 12.0 661 9.2 2.8* 
Real Estate 99 0 69 4 -4 1489 1.4 661 13.6 -12.2** 
Note: * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Interest rate regressions 
This table estimates the factors that affect the maturity, collateral status, and interest rate 
simultaneously. Relation_length, Maturity, and Credit_rating
11
 are centered by subtraction 
from the mean to avoid the multicollinearity problem. This rescaling has no effect on the 
correlation properties of the rescaled variable. The absolute value of the t-statistic is in 
parentheses. 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 1990-1995 1997-2004 
 Maturity Collateral 
Loan 
R_diff  Maturity Collateral 
Loan 
R_diff 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
State 0.754** 1.517 0.117  0.039 0.043 0.068** 
 (4.89) (0.03) (0.37)  (0.52) (0.29) (2.57) 
State*credit rating       0.046** 
       (2.84) 
Fitted maturity  -1.324 -1.424**   -1.823** -0.156 
  (-0.04) (-5.47)   (-20.68) (-1.22) 
Fitted collateral -0.858**  0.906**  -0.110**  0.115** 
 (-4.71)  (2.98)  (-2.46))  (4.16) 
Medium firm -0.552** -1.07 -0.395  0.138 0.322 -0.189** 
 (-3.06) (-0.01) (-1.26)  (1.15) (1.14) (-4.69) 
Large firm 0.127 0.608** 0.159  0.243* 0.501* -0.369** 
 (0.33) (21.61) (0.17)  (2.22) (1.99) (-6.79) 
Relation_length  0.216 -1.256**   -0.03* 0.033 
  (0.01) (-2.33)   (-2.3) (1.35) 
Credit_rating     0.016 0.027 -0.009 
     (1.58) (1.51) (-0.63) 
Credit_rating
2
     -0.004** -0.03*  
     (-2.9) (-2.3)  
Acceptance bill       -0.091 
       (-1.42) 
Commerce   0.402    0.066** 
   (1.21)    (2.23) 
Construction   1.112    0.059 
   (1.09)    (1.06) 
Foreign trade   0.502    -0.031 
   (0.89)    (-0.77) 
Nonclassifiable 
estab. 
  -2.632** 
  
 -0.002 
   (-2.61)    (-0.04) 
Real_estate   -1.986    0.038 
   (-1.89)    (0.7) 
Constant 0.930** 0.661 3.018**  0.670** 1.121** 0.481** 
 (6.67) (0.02) (6.23)  (18.69) (16.57) (7.05) 
Year Dummies   Yes    Yes 
Observations 168 168 168  1972 1972 1972 
AIC 1099  5615 
Log likelihood -516.54  -2767 
Schwarz Criterion 1202  5845 
 Note: * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level.  
                                                 
11 The bank did not have credit rating system before 1997, thus Credit rating is available only from 1997.  
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Table 4: Yearly statistics for individual loan  
Panel A Yearly statistics for individual loans for the entire sample 
 Amount of loan  R_diff  Credit_rating 
 
SOEs 
Private 
firms 
diff  SOEs 
Private 
firms 
diff  SOEs 
Private 
firms 
diff 
1990 5,110,000 480,000 4,630,000  0.216 2.390 -2.174  - - - 
1991 1,296,364 90,000 1,206,364  1.430 2.016 -0.586  - - - 
1992 1,264,000 690,000 574,000  2.998 0.738 2.260  - - - 
1993 1,973,529 1,015,455 958,074  2.986 1.631 1.355  - - - 
1994 1,343,857 1,265,185 78,672  2.597 3.239 -0.641  - - - 
1995 2,330,571 1,306,053 1,024,518  3.617 3.385 0.232  - - - 
1996 3,391,250 1,355,255 2,035,995*  1.547 1.427 0.120  - - - 
1997 1,894,794 2,649,346 -754,552  0.709 0.795 -0.085  4.826 4.870 -0.043 
1998 3,287,500 1,995,682 1,291,818  0.469 0.309 0.159  4.121 4.364 -0.242 
1999 4,620,315 2,512,609 2,107,706 **  0.742 0.961 -0.219*  3.132 3.710 -0.578** 
2000 8,760,138 5,318,038 3,442,100  0.631 0.844 -0.213**  3.144 3.184 -0.040 
2001 8,640,087 8,406,182 233,905  0.481 0.479 0.002  2.737 2.903 -0.166 
2002 6,750,325 8,923,946 -2,173,621  0.373 0.374 -0.001  2.784 2.701 0.082 
2003 7,971,622 11,200,000 -3,228,378  0.183 0.176 0.007  2.603 2.475 0.128 
2004 12,700,000 17,100,000 -4,400,000  0.221 0.324 -0.103*  2.174 2.410 -0.235 
 
Panel B Yearly observations for eliminated customers 
 observations 
 SOEs Private firms 
1990 2 5 
1991 10 2 
1992 13 6 
1993 14 11 
1994 29 25 
1995 31 28 
1996 32 35 
1997 55 56 
1998 11 8 
1999 4 2 
2000 5 2 
2001 5 3 
2002 1 1 
2003 0 0 
2004 2 0 
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Table 5: Analysis of credit rating and Altman’s Z score 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of Credit_rating. It ranged from 1 (best) to 6 (worst). 
 
Year Obs. Credit rating Std. Dev. 
1997 184 4.848 0.511 
1998 110 4.218 1.207 
1999 190 3.342 1.389 
2000 215 3.158 1.473 
2001 312 2.792 1.374 
2002 349 2.768 1.348 
2003 392 2.577 1.355 
2004 233 2.236 1.021 
 
 
Panel B: Subsample that comprises 132 bank loans to listed firms from 1997 to 2004. It provides 
descriptive statistics for credit rating, Altman’s Z score, and each element of Altman’s Z score.   
 
Variable N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Credit_rating 123 1.642 1.000 2.000 0.481 
Z Score 132 2.260 -1.310 7.853 1.322 
WC_TA 132 0.094 -0.637 0.669 0.198 
RE_TA 132 0.068 -0.481 0.230 0.086 
EBIT_TA 132 0.045 -0.108 0.151 0.046 
BVE_TL 132 1.470 0.185 6.072 1.046 
MV OF EQUITY_TL 132 2.361 0.515 11.196 1.858 
SALES_ASSET 132 0.488 0.000 1.286 0.258 
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Panel C: Spearman correlation coefficients. 
 
 Credit 
rating R_DIFF ZSCORE WC_TA RE_TA EBIT_TA BVE_TL MVEQUITY SALES_ASSET 
Credit rating 1.000         
R_DIFF .244** 1.000        
ZSCORE -.142 -.080 1.000       
WC_TA -.328** -.325** .441** 1.000      
RE_TA -.337** -.060 .247** -.047 1.000     
EBIT_TA -.375** .066 .407** -.215* .678** 1.000    
BVE_TL .159 -.109 .580** .452** -.079 -.194* 1.000   
MVEQUITY .164 .014 .776** .394** .001 .002 .823** 1.000  
SALES_ASSET -.119 .047 .447** -.234** .292** .618** -.074 .066 1.000 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
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Table 6: Nonperforming loan performance before and after the Act  
The NPL ratio is calculated as the annual nonperforming loans divided by the annual total amount of 
credit. 
 
Year NPL ratios (per cent) 
1994 65 
1995 65 
1996 63 
1997 52 
1998 45 
1999 41 
2000 38 
2001 35 
2002 43 
2003 28 
2004 11 
2005 3.80 
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Table 7: Recovery rate of NPLs 
This table presents the recovery rates from the four asset management corporations. Accumulated 
Disposal refers to the accumulated amount of cash and non-cash assets recovered as well as loss 
incurred by the end of the reporting period. Disposal Ratio is calculated as accumulated disposal 
divided by total NPAs purchased. Asset Recovery Ratio is calculated as total assets recovered divided by 
accumulated disposal. Cash Recovery Ratio is defined as cash recovered divided by accumulated 
disposal. 
 
The Four Asset Management Corporations 2004 
(Q4) 
2005 
(Q4) 
2006 
(Q1) 
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 6750.6 8397.5 8663.4 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 1370.0 1766.0 1805.6 
Disposal Ratio 53.96% 66.74% 68.61% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 25.48% 24.58% 24.20% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 20.29% 21.03% 20.84% 
    
China Huarong Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 2095.4 2433.8 2468.0 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 413.4 543.9 546.6 
Disposal Ratio 59.77% 69.17% 70.11% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 25.29% 26.92% 26.50% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 19.73% 22.35% 22.15% 
    
China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 2099.1 2633.9 2707.8 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 215.7 273.5 278.3 
Disposal Ratio 61.91% 77.88% 80.11% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 14.43% 12.90% 12.70% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 10.27% 10.39% 10.28% 
    
China Orient Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 1045.5 1317.6 1419.9 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 232.9 320.1 328.1 
Disposal Ratio 41.42% 52.08% 56.13% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 29.50% 28.73% 27.16% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 22.27% 24.30% 23.11% 
    
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 1510.6 2012.1 2067.7 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 508.1 628.4 652.6 
Disposal Ratio 48.90% 63.82% 64.69% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 38.29% 34.30% 34.46% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 33.64% 31.23% 31.56% 
 
 
 
